UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ANDREW CUOMO, * Case No. 22-MC-03044(LDH)

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Movant, * Brooklyn, New York

April 19, 2024

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NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

*

Respondent.

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TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR STATUS CONFERENCE AND ORAL ARGUMENT

BEFORE THE HONORABLE TARYN A. MERKL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

v.

For the Movant: RITA M GLAVIN, ESQ.

KATHERINE PETRINO, ESQ.

LEO KORMAN, ESQ.

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APPEARANCES: (Cont'd)

For the Non-Party Respondent, ANDREW STUART AMER, ESQ. NY State Attorney General:

SERENA MABEL LONGLEY, ESQ.

JAMES COONEY, ESQ. MICHAEL JAFFE, ESQ.

New York State Office of the

Attorney General 28 Liberty Street New York, NY 10005 2

Simon is a wonderful researcher. But at the end of the day, it falls on me. So thank you both for your willingness to accommodate her. I would hate to lose her valuable work. She's done a lot of background and reviewing the documents. It's just it would be difficult to sub in the other clerk. So thank you for that.

All right. So the first question is really the question of where are we on whether there have been any disclosures at all with regard to documents?

In the distant past, there was a conversation about turning over some very limited number of documents from the OAG investigation that pertains specifically to Trooper 1.

And I don't know if that every happened. I just wanted to close that loop.

MS. LONGLEY: Yes, Your Honor. I can speak to that.

That did happen. The Attorney General's Office voluntarily produced documents that were collected by the investigators that referenced Trooper 1 by name. I believe it was around 100 to 200 pages of documents.

I will note that after our office did that, we were accused of waiving our sovereign immunity by Cuomo for doing that, so we have not made any additional voluntary disclosures in the wake of that -- of the fact of our trying to come to a reasonable resolution of this being used against us.

THE COURT: And do -- which documents specifically

Now, that being said -- and so that's on the

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                  THE COURT: Mm-hmm.
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                  MR. COONEY: And this is in light of, as you can
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        imagine, all the other FOIL requests that we get. So again
        I'm not really here to speak to that, but just on my general
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        knowledge, that is what is occurring.
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                  THE COURT: Okay. And so your motion is fully
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        submitted and you don't have a -- I mean, I wouldn't expect
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        you to have a sense of when the judge may reach --
                  MR. COONEY: State court?
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                  THE COURT: Can be unpredictable?
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                  MR. COONEY: I only -- counsel might also know this.
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        I think his rules say that he wants oral arguments on Article
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        78s, so that might be a condition (indiscernible) to him even
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        looking at this. We have not heard anything.
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                  THE COURT: I see. Okay.
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                  Ms. Glavin, what is your view on how the FOIL
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        production is -- FOIL case is going and whether or not that's
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        solving any of the problems in this case?
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                  MS. GLAVIN: Okay. I just -- Your Honor, I normally
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        stand to address you, but I'm being told if I don't speak into
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        the microphone --
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                  THE COURT: That Theresa can't hear you.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: -- Theresa cannot hear me.
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                  THE COURT: I think that's right.
                  MS. GLAVIN: Okay. So I've been told by my co-
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counsel to speak into the microphone.
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Here's the status. The governor submitted FOIL requests, I think it was like last summer or last fall. What the FOIL request seeks are unredacted interview transcripts. So there's the 41 transcripts that were publicly released that are redacted. So one, unredacted transcripts. And two, the witness interview memos.

THE COURT: And it was a much broader list --

MS. GLAVIN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- than in the narrowed --

MS. GLAVIN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- list you had submitted to me --

MS. GLAVIN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- following my sort of bigger ruling,

is that right?

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MS. GLAVIN: Yes. Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. GLAVIN: And just to give context to this, the
New York Daily News had also made a FOIL request. And this is
in our Article 78 petition. They had made a FOIL request for
those same interview memos. The Attorney General's Office
denied it. And they denied it on appeal stating that this was
attorney-client privilege and work product. So they refused
to produce the interview memos.

So the governor's request covers interview memos and

unredacted transcripts.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. GLAVIN: The response from the AG's Office was that they expected to produce, may begin produce responsive documents on a rolling basis in I think it was March of 2024, this year.

We filed the Article 78 in January and it was not on grounds of constructive denial. It was on grounds of both. It was constructive and actual denial. And the basis for the actual denial is that the Attorney General's Office has already said to another FOIL applicant we're not giving you interview memos. And then we proceeded to cite what the Attorney General's Office's position has been in this case, which is they have repeatedly said that this is — these are privileged materials. And also with respect to the unredacted witness interview transcripts, they're also claiming privilege as well.

So the position that we took in the Article 78 petition is they're never going to give us this -- and what was produced. So we filed our petition. The Attorney General's Office did not answer.

They produced in March, I think it was around March 1st, six of the 41 transcripts that were publicly released and they were still redacted.

I would note for one of the transcripts that they

produced to us, it was the Alphonso David transcript, they added more redactions to that transcript than what they had already publicly released in 2021. And so the next batch that they produced within the last week or so is three more transcripts. And again they have redactions.

So they moved and said it's moot. We are producing. So they moved to dismiss.

Our opposition says it's not moot because they're not producing the interview memos. They know it. They've already said that to somebody else. They're saying it in this litigation. And it's ripe because we asked for unredacted transcripts and we're not getting unredacted transcripts (indiscernible) release. They replied that is fully briefed and pending.

So the state of the Article 78 is no interview memos produced. There is no commitment by the Attorney General's Office to produce the interview memos. And we know they have already denied a FOIL application.

And so where I think we will end up is that I think that we will have argument on the issue of whether it's moot or not. We don't think it is because we're not going to get it. So the judge is going to have to make a call on this.

And so if the judge makes the call and says I'm denying this, we think there is a constructive for actual denial, then the AG's Office has to answer and I can't give

you a timeline.

THE COURT: I understand.

All right. So, you know, I obviously didn't expect to hear any earthshattering change in terms of the state of play with regard to what had been produced or what is going to be produced, but it is useful to know sort of what's going on.

So, you know, I will be very candid. You know, we undertook to begin privilege review looking at the documents that Cuomo was seeking against the assertions of privilege that the Attorney General's Office has included in the privilege log, and on the basis of the prior briefing, but as we all know that prior briefing was some time ago and it was also not as squarely focused on the privilege issues as perhaps it needs to be to provide a level of granularity that a court would need to make a true ruling on the applicability of the various privileges.

So we have many questions on -- about, you know, sort of how we should proceed in this case. And I have many questions about the assertions of the privilege in various contexts.

So, you know, in terms of next steps, Ms. Glavin, what are you looking to accomplish? I mean, I know -- I know you want everything. I get it. But realistically, what are you trying to actually get in this case and how do you want to proceed procedurally here?

MS. GLAVIN: So, Your Honor, in -- what is at issue in the narrowed requests is at docket entry 51-1. Okay. And there are four categories that are at issue. And I think one and three overlap, but 51-1 is what we're looking at.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

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MS. GLAVIN: And we are looking for interview memos of Trooper 1 herself. She was informally interviewed in April. And then there was a -- April of 2021 -- and then there was an on-the-record interview in May of 2021.

We are seeking the interview memos, unredacted transcripts, for any of the state police witnesses. And the universe, as I see it, based on what was produced to Your Honor, is we're talking about 36 total interview memos here. Twenty-four of those memos, again, this is what I ascertained in the privilege log, 24 of them are New York State Police witnesses. And then the remaining are the interview memos and unredacted transcripts for the ten other complainants that are included in the Trooper 1 lawsuit. That's the universe.

And then, which I think -- so we're talking 36 memos, 24 of which are New York State Police members, and then there are 12 transcripts that overlap some. I think there are two or three transcripts of state police witnesses and the rest are of the complainants.

THE COURT: It's true that we're having a universe of many layers of issues, but with regard to your assertion of

relevance, you know, in looking at the, you know, the privileged documents that have been submitted for my review, a good number of the facts are already disclosed in the Attorney General's reports. There are also facts that I think I would find to be clearly privileged. You know, personal identifying information, and details about security for the governor's mansion.

And, you know, there's a lot of detail in these memos particularly in the state police memos about their jobs, what they're doing day to day, what their responsibilities are with regard to the PSU. And those -- that is not relevant to this case and it is not -- it is privileged. It is law enforcement information.

And so, you know, there are many issues with trying to seek the interview memos in which the sovereign immunity issue is still of course looming. In addition, there are many layers of privilege that have been asserted.

And some of them are valid, Ms. Glavin. And so I'm just not sure what you procedurally think is realistic here.

MS. GLAVIN: So with respect to the law enforcement privilege, I want to talk about a couple of things.

One is we disagree about whether it applies specifically, and I'm looking at the *In re City of New York*, the Second Circuit case, because the law enforcement privilege and what you're talking about in that case is it comes into

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        place where you're talking about law enforcement techniques.
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        Like in that particular case where it applied --
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                  THE COURT: As am I. I'm talking about security
        protocols for the governor's mansion.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: But the governor has familiarity with
        those. And those are --
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                  THE COURT: It doesn't mean he gets it from them.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: But there's a protective order in place
        in this --
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                  THE COURT: It's still privileged. That doesn't get
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        around privilege.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: So, Your Honor, to the extent you're
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        talking about the security precautions for the Governor of the
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        State of New York, he is familiar with those.
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                  And so I -- I'm at a loss as to how, you know, the
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        former chief executive of the State of New York, who answer to
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        the governor, who is very familiar with what they're setting
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        up and the procedures.
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                  THE COURT: It doesn't waive their privilege.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: It doesn't waive --
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                  THE COURT: The fact that he has prior knowledge
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        does not waive their privilege.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: But, Your Honor, it could not be more
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        relevant here because it goes to a number of these witnesses
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        inside the Attorney General's report. There are about 15 to
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20 witnesses referred to in the Attorney General's report that are New York State Troopers that are not identified by name that are cited as either corroborating witnesses or witnesses that don't remember with respect to or do not corroborate Trooper 1. They are material witnesses to her allegations, which is why they're cited in the Attorney General's report.

To the extent they are fact witnesses about the incidents that Trooper 1 is talking about in her complaint, they are relevant. And the problem we have is very few state troopers were done, had interview transcripts. I think it's actually only three. I think the only three people that they did formal, on-the-record interviews with was Trooper 1, David Dively, who was head of the detail, and we have deposed him, as well as Vincent Straface, who was head of the detail and we deposed him.

I would note that with respect to the troopers that we have already taken depositions for nobody has come in and asserted law enforcement privilege when we have asked them about certain facts of the case.

So to the extent you're talking about law enforcement privilege, one, I think it has been waived by the fact that the Attorney General's Office hasn't objected to testimony about security concerns or their techniques. So that's first and foremost.

Second, with respect to why it's relevant, it is

also relevant to which each of these troopers who are watching him on a day-to-day basis what they saw, what they heard.

Some of these troopers know some of the other complainants. I will give you an example.

Vinny Straface who was head of the detail, he testified he knew Lindsey Boylan. He knew Kaitlin [NAME REDACTED]. He testified about what he saw about what Lindsey Boylan's interactions were with the governor. He also testified about having received a message from Lindsey Boylan well after she left saying that tell the governor to the extent, you know, I miss him, et cetera.

These are relevant to the extent Trooper 1 is talking about where she was at a particular time, what happened at a particular time. What the other troopers have to say about that is very vital to our defense. Whether they ever witnessed this behavior. Their impressions of whether he — how he acted at the holiday parties or invited people upstairs. Yes. I think they could not be more relevant. These are the witnesses that the Attorney General cites in their report which is exactly what Trooper 1 is relying upon.

The other issue we have is that Trooper 1 cites to a number or state police troopers in her disclosures. And we talk about that at ECF 51-1. They are witnesses to this case which becomes vitally important.

I can tell you some of the core interview memos that

we know about. Major Nevins, who used to be head of the detail, we took his deposition. But he talked about having been interviewed by the Attorney General's Office. And I think he was the first person that brought allegations relevant to Trooper 1, although he never overlapped with her, so what he knows is hearsay or what he heard from Trooper 1, he reports it to the Attorney General's Office.

It is important to us to know what did Trooper 1 tell him and what did he relay to the Attorney General's Office in the first conversation that he had about it? Does that differ from what her allegations were now? Did it include all of the allegations?

THE COURT: I understand you're looking for inconsistencies --

MS. GLAVIN: It's more than that.

THE COURT: -- but it's -- how is somebody whistle blowing to the top law enforcement officer of the state not being protected in their disclosures to that officer consistent with public policy? You're going to create a chill and nobody's going to want to the Attorney General's Office if we turn all of this over.

MS. GLAVIN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: About anything.

MS. GLAVIN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Not just about high-profile cases,

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they're not going to have any confidence in the Attorney

General's ability to keep their identities or their interview

memos safe.
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MS. GLAVIN: Your Honor, this is the Attorney
General's Office that released all of these witness
transcripts without getting their consent, so I'm a little
surprised that we're going down this road.

THE COURT: It's the privilege that may --

MS. GLAVIN: So you --

THE COURT: That may have waived some privileges for sure with regard to some of the facts, but does it waive all?

And what is your authority for that?

MS. GLAVIN: With respect --

THE COURT: No. That's a very significant issue here.

MS. GLAVIN: Oh, I think it -- I think the very fact -- look at the *Kidder* case. The very fact that the Attorney General's Office issued a report and cites what anonymous troopers saw, and what they claimed to have heard, and what they didn't see, and what they told her they didn't see, could not be more relevant. Once the Attorney General's Office issues --

THE COURT: It's not the question. Relevance is not the question.

MS. GLAVIN: Thank you.

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                  THE COURT: The question is how does it waive
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        privilege?
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                  MS. GLAVIN: Okay. So thank you on relevance not
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        being the question.
                  Going to privilege, look at the Kidder case.
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                                                                 The
        very fact that the Attorney General's Office issued a report,
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        and it's not just a -- this was 165 pages with tons of
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        footnote citing to what was in all of these memos, they waived
        it, and we think the case law is very good on our side.
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                  But back to law enforcement privilege. I would
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        note, okay, the New York State Police themselves has not
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        objected or waived law enforcement privilege in this case.
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        That speaks volumes. That speaks absolutely volumes. And we
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        already have documents that the New York State Police has
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        produced to us that go to the very security about how the
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        governor's protected and they have never claimed privilege.
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        That is telling.
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                  THE COURT: The New York State Police can't waive
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        the privilege for the Attorney General either.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: Of course the -- no --
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                  THE COURT: No, they cannot.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: Law enforcement privilege?
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                  THE COURT: The New York State Police cannot waive
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        the --
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                  MS. GLAVIN: They waived it by producing tons of
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        documents to us that --
                  THE COURT: The New York State Police --
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                  MS. GLAVIN: But --
                  THE COURT: -- is not controlled by the Attorney
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        General's Office or vice versa.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: We --
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                  THE COURT: What is your authority for the notion
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        that one agency action can waive a privilege for a different
        agency within the executive branch?
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                  MS. GLAVIN: Because this is the exact -- Your
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        Honor, this is the exact agency --
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                  THE COURT: It's not the exact --
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                  MS. GLAVIN: -- that enforces this. This is the
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        exact -- this would be if the New York State Police --
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                  THE COURT: That's not authority. What is your
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        authority for the proposition --
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                  MS. GLAVIN: The authority is the cat is out of the
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        baq.
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                  THE COURT: It's not that simple.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: It's pretty simple.
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                  THE COURT: No, it's not.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: The cat is out of the --
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                  THE COURT: It's --
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                  MS. GLAVIN: If they release these publicly, the cat
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        would be out of the bag. You have to weigh this.
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some problems. And believe me, I'm going to be asking Mr.

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Amer.

But I still am not hearing the authority for the proposition that the actions of an executive branch official or personnel person can somehow waive the privilege on behalf of the top law enforcement officer of the State of New York.

MS. GLAVIN: Let me separate this out. Okay.

I now will have to go back in their briefs because I don't think the Attorney General's Office, either in the Bennett case, which is now fully briefed and pending before Judge Cave, we have oral argument May 8th, or in this case that they have been raising it discloses things about security for the governor. What they have focused on on their law enforcement privilege is it goes to the techniques used in the 638 investigation.

THE COURT: And I mentioned that as well.

MS. GLAVIN: Okay. So let's --

THE COURT: But what -- what I have done, which I don't think Judge Cave has undertaken at this juncture, is actually read the documents.

MS. GLAVIN: Okay.

THE COURT: And in reviewing the documents, I think there are many layers of privilege. And the problem that I'm having, which I plan to discuss with Mr. Amer and Ms. Longley, is I don't actually know on the basis of the privilege review which portions of which documents you're relying on which

privilege for. If that makes sense. And so I'm not in a position to guess.

Perhaps you're relying on the full report as privileged under the law enforcement privilege and/or deliberative process privilege work product. I don't know.

And I also don't know if it's also more granular. And that's some of the issues that I wanted to discuss with them.

MS. GLAVIN: We also have from production from the Albany County District Attorney's Office I think it -- I think we have maybe two memos of state police troopers and nobody raised the law enforcement privilege objection.

THE COURT: They are raising it now, Ms. Glavin. So like the notion that other people aren't arguing in other contexts is just not relevant to me. It's just --

MS. GLAVIN: They're not raising it on the grounds that you're saying. Point me to a page in the brief.

THE COURT: That's one of the things I started with. I specifically said to them I'm not certain as to the granular basis for some of these objections and I plan to discuss it with them.

MS. GLAVIN: This is --

THE COURT: I am conducting a privilege review without sufficient factual basis, which is the first thing I said, and I plan to address it with them.

And instead of focusing on the questions I have, which are the authority for the notion that they have waived their privilege writ large, you're arguing with me over things that they have to answer.

THE COURT: Okay. So, Your Honor, first of all, this actually, what you are raising, is something sua sponte that has not been in the briefs. I'm happy to brief that.

THE COURT: 100 percent. 100 percent.

MS. GLAVIN: I'm happy to brief that for you.

THE COURT: I am raising a whole bunch of things sua sponte today that are not in the brief, because having looked at the documents, I am adrift.

There are a lot of facts and I don't have a sufficient factual predication to fully understand the basis for some of the assertions because of concerns about waiver, concerns about which litigation things were allegedly anticipatory. I have -- you know, there's -- I have a whole list of questions regarding the applicable privileges.

I was giving one example, which I don't necessarily need to have briefed depending upon what their basis for their assertions are.

MS. GLAVIN: But we may want to brief it because we're hearing it for the first time.

THE COURT: I am not necessarily even saying that those portions of those reports would be withheld on that

basis.

I am saying that having done a privilege review in the dark without a lot of factual predication as to the basis of the OAG's assertion of privilege on a sort of line-by-line or topic-by-topic analysis, certain things jumped off the page to me as potentially problematic with regard to disclosing these documents writ large.

And I don't think that the parties, because of the way that this unfolded, I just don't think that we have a very full record of what the OAG's position is with regard to the assertion of privilege over different categories.

So these are questions for them.

MS. GLAVIN: So I have another issue I want to raise with you because you're talking about witnesses coming forward and I want to separate this out.

Let's separate out, because what we're talking about here, the categories, we're talking about New York State

Police witnesses, so interview memos and transcripts, and then you're talking about the complainants.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MS. GLAVIN: With respect to the complainants, their transcripts have been released. They were subpoenaed.

There's not going to be a chilling effect because the Attorney General's Office has subpoena power under 638 for these investigations. Whether the witnesses like it or not, they

are subpoenaed.

And a number of those witnesses, the ten complainants, they went and talked to CBS, New York Magazine, New York Times, ABC, that was their choice. And so with respect to those ten complainants, the AG's Office had no problem telling the world what they had to say. We need those interview memos.

Then let's talk about the state police. Okay? We're not talking --

THE COURT: Pause. Pause.

Mr. Amer, with regard to the complainants, what is the basis? Which privileges are you specifically relying on? Because one of the things I found slightly frustrating about the privilege log is sort of the mixed bag, multiple privileges asserted over multiple documents.

And, you know, with regard to the attorney-client privilege, for example, you know, what authority do you have for the proposition that communications underlying the report were attorney-client communications? And the case law that was included in the original briefing just doesn't really answer these questions.

I recognize this is like the third issue in the original briefing, but I have questions about the applicability of the attorney-client privilege. I have questions about the applicability of the attorney work product

privilege. Because it's unclear to me what litigation these documents were prepared in anticipation of. It feels like a lot of these documents were prepared for the purposes of preparing the report. And I'm curious if you have any clear authority that the work product privilege and the attorney work product privileges apply in those contexts?

So I'm not sure who --

MR. AMER: Well --

THE COURT: -- wants to address these issues or -- sort of -- we just need to figure out a way to proceed.

MR. AMER: Yeah. Your Honor, let me make a few preliminary observations. I think Ms. Longley can address some of the more pointed questions about the privilege issues.

Let me say first I think Your Honor's March 29th decision denying the request to de-designate certain documents produced in discovery by non parties has two points that are relevant, at least in my view, in our view, to the law enforcement privilege.

The first is Your Honor has recognized that a lot of the information that was conveyed to our office during the investigation was highly-sensitive information, personal information, information about sexual histories, and medical histories, and that is exactly the type of information that the law enforcement privilege applies to, because the second point of the decision was a recognition that the non parties

relied heavily on their right to designate material as confidential in the protective order. And I think there is a strong parallel between non parties relying on a right to designate material as confidential in discovery and the non parties' right to rely on promises made by our office, by the investigators, during the course of the investigation that gave them comfort to be more forthcoming.

And I think, you know, one comment in Your Honor's decision was that, you know, absent the right to rely on a confidentiality designation, discovery would have stalled.

And I think there is a parallel here. That absent the ability of the Attorney General's Office to confer in a meaningful way guarantee of confidentiality that our investigation would stall, that the ability to get cooperation from witnesses would be in jeopardy.

And that in this case if the law enforcement privilege is not upheld, we are going to have issues going forward, as Your Honor I think has already recognized, in getting witnesses to be forthcoming and cooperate.

So I put that out there just so you understand with respect to the law enforcement privilege.

I will say that I don't think much has changed. I don't think anything's changed since we addressed this issue quite some time ago with respect to this narrowed request.

It includes the interview memos. And I recall Your

Honor saying to Ms. Glavin there is no way that the Attorney General's Office will voluntarily give you the interview memos. And you asked us if that was correct and we confirmed, yes, that is correct. And it remains the case today. We will not willingly, voluntarily provide the interview memos. They're clearly covered by law enforcement privilege for all the reasons we've said in our briefs already.

There is a second point that Your Honor made at that last I can't recall if it was a conference or actually oral argument on the motions that I think was in a -- a very astute, practical observation, which is that we have a threshold issue in this case on sovereign immunity that can be appealed all the way up to the Second Circuit on an interlocutory basis. That is clear. And your astute observation was there is no way that that issue will be briefed here in the district court and in the circuit court and decided before this case gets tried.

So as a practical matter, that's just where we are.

And we do consider sovereign immunity a threshold issue. It's been decided in our favor by one judge in this court already in the Felix case. It's now been briefed to Magistrate Judge Cave.

We think it's, you know, under Second Circuit precedent that our position is correct because the circuit has already decided that a subpoena against a government agency is

a proceeding under the *Dugan* case for purposes of triggering sovereign immunity.

And then it all comes down to has it been waived.

And we just don't see how there are any facts in this case
that would permit a finding of waiver. There has been no
waiver in this case.

So I guess, you know, from our perspective, I appreciate Your Honor is rolling up your sleeves and digging into the documents that have been submitted in camera.

I will note that I'm not sure if the -- if Your

Honor is aware, but the very fact that we provided these

documents in camera to this court is being raised as a basis

for arguing waiver before Magistrate Judge Cave.

THE COURT: Yes. I'm certain that Judge Cave will see that for what it is.

MR. AMER: I'm sure as well.

But the point being that, you know, I do think while we want to engage in any questions the Court has about documents that have been submitted in camera, we're very reluctant to discuss them in any detail because we expect that will be further basis for a waiver argument before Judge Cave and we prefer not to provide that, you know, argument to be made even though we understand what it's worth.

I think, you know, I appreciate Your Honor wants to get into the detail of the privilege assertions, but I will

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say candidly that, you know, we have our sovereign immunity issue that we are not going to waive. And so, you know, from our perspective, that is a threshold issue that Your Honor needs to address and decide if Your Honor's inclined to rule against us on any aspect of our privilege defenses because the ultimate result of that would be an order that compels production and we can't get there unless the Court addresses first the sovereign immunity issue.

THE COURT: I fully understand and agree with you,

Mr. Amer, that that is -- that issue would have to be decided

if I were to conclude that there are no privileges.

MR. AMER: Correct.

THE COURT: But as I noted in my prior ruling, I think that this is a very complex issue.

And although I have a great respect for Judge Locke,
I am not fully sold on the notion that the New York State
Attorney General's Office and the New York State apparatus has
-- any state apparatus has sovereign immunity for all of time
from all federal inquiries.

You're talking about federal question cases. And the fact that, you know, for example, the New York State

Legislature has to, you know -- the gerrymandering cases that come on the political gerrymandering come to the federal courts every decade for the courts to redraw the maps for New York State. If the New York -- if the courts were unable to

get documents from New York State in trying to rule on cases of that ilk and trying to rule on cases involving significant federal civil rights claims, I don't know that our system, our federal system could work.

MR. AMER: But I also don't see how a ruling here gets you to that -- what I would call parade of horribles because --

THE COURT: No. I think it's directly related.

MR. AMER: Well, in these cases though, Your Honor, federal -- state officers are named as defendants through ex parte Young and discovery is conducted on a party basis. I've handled any number of Eighth Amendment claims against docs and you name the superintendent of the facility and you get docs documents by subpoena, by serving party notices on the defendant in that case.

Anyway, I think --

THE COURT: I understand. But in the New York State redistricting cases not every in-state entity with relevant documents is a party.

MR. AMER: Whether that means they don't have custody, possession or control over the documents I think is another matter. And I do think that there is that avenue and argument that is, you know, possible.

I think where we need to go here is we're going to need to brief, if Your Honor requires it, brief again the

sovereign immunity issue because I just -- let me back up.

You know, the Court originally denied the motion to compel on relevance and burden ground and on that basis didn't need to reach these other issues.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. AMER: That motion has now been fully resolved.

So I think what's before the Court is this motion --

THE COURT: I actually --

MR. AMER: -- our motion to quash. I think that remains the pending motion, and I think that can be the basis for the Court to address these additional issues.

So we can respond to your questions on privilege. I know you have issues with some of the privilege. I will just say, you know, to the extent that the Court is not prepared to grant our motion to quash in full based on the privilege assertions and will then --

And by the way, the relevance and burden I think still apply even to this narrowed request. I think you've got in the affidavits the amount of time it would take us to redact for personal information even the interview memos and all of the transcripts.

But at any rate, you know, if the result is going to be anything other than granting our motion to quash based on privilege and/or relevance burden, then we obviously need to have the Court rule on sovereign immunity. That's just the

reality of where we are.

And I will also point out that, you know, there's no possible way we would put ourselves in a position where the production of any document on a voluntary, consensual basis in our view, you know, that's going to lead to a deposition subpoena for sure. And we are just not going to put ourselves in a position where we're all of a sudden having to field deposition subpoenas for the investigators and we're going to have an even louder chorus of waiver of sovereign immunity than we've had to date based on any additional documents that we might provide.

So I'm just trying to be candid with Your Honor as to all the reasons why we think we're just not going to be able to resolve this short of getting a decision that deals with all these issues.

THE COURT: I understand.

And, you know, the reason that I was turning to the privilege candidly is because the sovereign immunity question in my mind is so very thorny that it's a constitutional avoidance question.

As I set forth in my prior opinion, I don't think it's -- I've been very transparent that, you know, I think that it's a very complex issue. I think the Fifth Circuit's case is cabinable on its facts. I mean, we're trying to subpoena sitting judges. I mean, it's -- you know. And I

think that they could have easily just ruled on judicial immunity, absolute judicial immunity, chose to go in a different direction.

But I don't necessarily think that the Fifth Circuit case, given the factual differences and the history differences between, you know, the judiciary and the executive branch with regards to level of involvement in investigations and individual lives and policy choices that come to court for litigation on a regular basis, I think they're very different, so I think the Fifth Circuit case is very different than what we have here.

MR. AMER: All I'll say, and I know this shouldn't be turned into an oral argument on either sovereign immunity or privileges, but I will say that the Fifth Circuit was relying on Second Circuit precedent in *UPA and Glodser* (ph), and nobody's -- nobody's been able to explain to me how the Second Circuit holding, which is binding obviously on this court, somehow isn't applicable because there you were talking about a subpoena served on a federal agency versus a subpoena which is here served on a state agency.

The difference between a state agency and a federal agency just has no bearing on the rationale that the Second Circuit employed based on the *Dugan* case. It was, you know, a subpoena on a government agency is a suit for purposes of sovereign immunity. Many circuits have concluded otherwise.

And as the briefing before Magistrate Judge Cave has shown those are the cases that the other side is relying on.

But, you know, this court doesn't have the option to, you know, revisit the reasoning of the Second Circuit versus these other circuits and say I think the other circuits make more sense. You know.

THE COURT: Well, with all respect, the federal government is just different from the state.

And when the -- you know, when the states entered into the Union, you know, you made clear at our argument over a year ago that you're relying on common law, sovereign immunity that existed prior to ratification of the Constitution.

MR. AMER: As well as the Eleventh Amendment, yes.

THE COURT: As well as the Eleventh Amendment, right?

MR. AMER: Yes. Yes. Yes.

THE COURT: And I asked you that question very purposefully because I wanted to understand exactly what your position was.

And the idea that states lost no rights whatsoever when they entered into a federal system where the federal government is supreme and the federal government has to resolve issues involving state agencies on a regular basis, it just doesn't sit well with me. It doesn't sit correctly.

And it's -- it's borne out when you look at the differences in how legislative privileges treat it with state legislatures versus the federal legislature.

Legislative privilege in the state level is considered to be a qualified privilege, whereas the federal legislative privilege is significantly stronger I would posit having done a very deep dive into that issue for the AJC subpoena.

And my view is that the executive branch privilege cannot possibly be absolute when the federal government has to occasionally adjudicate issues involving the state. And sometimes those issues are of incredible federal importance. And to say that the state has absolute immunity from federal subpoena is really problematic in our system of government.

This is to fundamental stuff. I've looked at treatises. I've read some of the federalist papers. This is fundamental and I'm not prepared to go there.

MR. AMER: I understand. You know. I appreciate too that every state has their form of freedom -- of Freedom of Information Laws that are a, you know, clear, clear waiver.

THE COURT: I mean, I am prepared to go there. I just don't think it's what you want.

MR. AMER: Clear waiver.

THE COURT: And I don't need to reach it if I -- if
I agree with you on the privileges.

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MR. AMER: Nobody would be happier than the people on this side of the table if we could avoid reaching sovereign immunity because you agree with us completely on our privilege assertions or relevance and burden and, therefore, grant our motion to guash.

So if the issue is, you know, do you, you know, are we insisting that we get a ruling on sovereign immunity, of course not.

But I do hear Your Honor saying that while you agree with some of our privilege assertions you have problems with other aspects of it.

And so I think the recognition here is that either we can get a favorable ruling in its entirety on our motion to quash through the privilege assertions, or if not then there's just no way to avoid having to grapple with the harder, thornier issues of sovereign immunity.

THE COURT: I would love to write on it, but I actually believe it has constitutional avoidance.

MR. AMER: So maybe we should get to your detailed questions on the privilege issues. And hopefully between me and Ms. Longley, who has more, you know, knowledge in the weeds on the documents that we submitted in camera, we can try and address your concerns and questions.

THE COURT: All right. So one thing you started to touch upon was the procedural situation and that's one thing

that I did want to address.

We're kind of in this sort of murky, gray area.

Perhaps we're still operating on the motion to quash, we're operating on, you know, this narrowed list that Cuomo submitted at ECF 51-1, but, you know, there's -- it's the briefing on these matters is a little old and it's a little bit not exactly what's currently before the Court, which is part of what I was struggling with in conducting this privilege review.

And I certainly want to make sure that we figure out a procedure to address giving the parties a full opportunity to be heard. And I'm not -- wou know, to your point, Ms.

Glavin, I'm not planning to do my (indiscernible) review in the dark and dream up my own privileges. I need them to tell me what they're relying on for which pieces of which documents and that's where I was having challenge in the -- with given the current briefing.

Briefing on the privilege issues, as you know, is small. In the privilege review, any of the documents have multiple privileges asserted. And so it's hard for me to discern with any clarity what you're relying on and how.

And so, Ms. Longley, you know, what are your -- I don't know if you want to respond to anything I've asked so far or if we just want to come up with a plan.

MS. LONGLEY: I'd be happy to respond. And

especially -- I mean, there was extensive discussion by Ms. Glavin about the law enforcement privilege and focus on security concerns.

And if I can start there, I would like to just reframe it which is, you know, I think Your Honor's raising of security issues was not sua sponte. It's actually at document 20 in this case. And it's in the declaration submitted in support of our motion to quash where we lay out the types of information that are covered by -- that the law enforcement privilege is intended to protect, and we specifically cite security plans, including security footage of government buildings, and floor plans of government offices, as well as something that Ms. Glavin didn't touch on, which is personal information about the witnesses, including certain information about some of their personal or romantic relationships.

And of course we are prepared to further brief and put in more showings on this as long as we can do that in a way that doesn't threaten any of our privileges on it. So it's a delicate dance perhaps.

But what I will say is I actually think there is enough in briefing as it exists and on the documents on their faces for the Court to look at the documents.

And what I can say is I think law enforcement privilege is the easiest one because we are asserting it over the documents in their entirety. Not every single document

that we've submitted for in camera review has security plans in it. Some of them do. But all of the documents have personal and private information about witnesses, which is one of the types of information that the law enforcement privilege is intended to protect.

That can include identities of unknown witnesses.

It can also include private information just about witnesses that are already known or their family members and that's in every single document. That's in every single interview memo. That's in every — and that's also the nature of the redactions on the transcripts that have been provided to the Court.

So I also would just say that the discussion there on law enforcement privilege was pretty off base because it was talking about whether this is -- this information is relevant to the case and relevance is not the question.

It's actually in order to overcome the law enforcement privilege, the party would have to show they have a compelling need for the information, which is to say that they can't actually litigate their case without it, without that information, because it is actually at issue in the case.

And OAG is not on trial here. The investigation is not at issue. I don't think anyone can seriously argue that there's information in those interview memos that without that information the case grinds to a halt, that the case can be

adjudicated without that information, and that's the standard the Second Circuit set forth in the *In re City of New York* case. And in addition -- so they're nowhere near that.

I think that every single document there, I think the Court could actually look at it and see information that is covered by the types of information protected by the law enforcement privilege.

THE COURT: But what do we do about the waiver problem? Because, you know, in reviewing the report, looking at the transcripts online, and comparing them to the documents, so many of the facts have been publicly disclosed by the Attorney General themselves?

MS. LONGLEY: If I may, before you can get to waiver, that actually completely undoes their argument about overcoming law enforcement privilege, because to have a compelling need, you have to show you can't get the information somewhere else. So if the information is available somewhere else, then they don't have a compelling need for it.

And a lot of the discussion about information that the police have provided, that OAG has not objected to, even though we didn't know about it and we're not party to those depositions, or in a position to object, but in any event if they're getting that information from the police, then they don't have a compelling need to get that same information from

OAG.

So I think before you even get to waiver, you know, they don't have a compelling need.

But in terms of information, you know, the law enforcement privilege protects information itself. And unless that information that we've redacted or withheld in those interview memos is actually in the report, then it hasn't been waived.

And there was a very careful process, and it took a lot of time and a lot of effort to redact the transcripts, to do it in a way that protected confidentiality to the greatest extent possible, which is what was -- which is the assurance that was given to witnesses who agreed to cooperate.

And so I don't -- you know, I am not aware of -- and if there was any information let's say that is actually in a transcript and happens to be in a memo, one, they don't have a need for it, but, I don't -- I don't -- it could have been -- you know, I can't even imagine what it is, I don't know what it is -- and any attempts by them to say that it's there would be speculative because they actually don't know what's in the memos either.

So I don't -- I don't see a waiver. We've consistently asserted law enforcement privilege over these materials.

So I don't know if I -- if there's something more

specific that Your Honor has concern about waiver, but I don't see a basis for it.

THE COURT: All right. So, Ms. Glavin, would you like to respond to any of that?

MS. GLAVIN: Of course, Your Honor. A couple of things.

One is with respect to what's referred to as personal information about witnesses, whether it's romantic relationships, things about the kids. I have an idea about what some of this relates to with people's children, the protective order easily covers that. That's not part of the law enforcement privilege. People's personal information or privacy concerns are addressed by the protective order.

Second, with respect to the law enforcement privilege. What we would ask is that the Attorney General has made generalized claims of law enforcement privilege. And we would ask that on a witness-by-witness basis for each of these — so you separate it out. You've got the ten complainants, okay, which we don't think any law enforcement privilege applies to that. And I have looked at — we probably have — I don't know how many interview memos we have from the Albany County District Attorney's discovery, but I don't think in those interview memos people were promised confidentiality. They couldn't. Because they knew that they were going to be doing a report.

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What they did say to people that I saw repeatedly is we would try to keep it confidential. And we see that in some of the interview transcripts. So people were not given 100 percent assurances of confidentiality. They couldn't.

Because they knew they were doing a report on this. So that's the -- I want to address that.

One is I don't think the exception applies, but I think they have to make a particularized showing for each of the these memos, because I think you're talking about -- if you're talking about law enforcement techniques, then you're talking about the 20 in a four state police witnesses.

The problem we have is that Trooper 1's complaint in her allegations, she's making them about things that happen on her day-to-day job as a member of the protective services detail and, therefore, what they're doing, who's around, and what the security was that day becomes part of the case.

Let's take one example. Trooper 1 alleges that in September of 2019, while she was at an event for Belmont, she talks about herself and there is another PSU officer who are in the front, that would be Fabrizio Kozkazinsky (ph).

THE COURT: This the stomach touching?

MS. GLAVIN: This is the stomach touch.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MS. GLAVIN: And it has become very important to us

as to what the security was that day because we think there would have been people behind that would have been there with the governor. It's rare that he doesn't have a circle around him. And so all of that becomes relevant in terms of who was holding the door, who was in front of her that day. So that part of security becomes relevant.

What happens from when he gets out of the car, who caught the car that day, where on the way in it happened, we actually would be interested in what the floor plan was.

We've been trying to figure that out as to what the route was for him that day going into Belmont --

THE COURT: Relevance does not waive the privilege.

MS. GLAVIN: No, but it's it's compelling need. I don't think A, that they have made it out, but it's a qualified privilege.

But B, to defend what she is saying about what happened that day, where she was, who saw what, who were the witnesses that day, we have a need to understand throughout that day because we don't think that what she is describing could have happened the way it's been described. And there's also been several versions of this from other troopers that day. That becomes very important to us.

With respect to the elevator touch, that particular day she talks about her job was to catch the governor that day, so it becomes important to us why -- what that means, why

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she was there, who is in front of the governor when you got on
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        the elevator, and why somebody's in the back, and what they're
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        job is that day. Some of the other --
                  THE COURT: But what --
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                  MS. GLAVIN: But all of that becomes important --
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                  THE COURT: But so much of this information is
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        already in the report. I mean, what are you looking for
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        that's not in the report?
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                  MS. GLAVIN: What the other trooper said about these
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        particular events, because a lot of what is in the report --
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        Your Honor, we cite -- look at --
                  THE COURT: So you're looking for what's not
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        included in the report?
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                  MS. GLAVIN: There was a lot that's not included in
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        the report with respect to -- look at 51-1. Look at what we
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        ask for in number three.
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                  THE COURT: Yeah. But I just want to understand
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              I want to understand this.
        this.
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                  So you're -- to the extent that the information is
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        included in the report, it's available.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: Right.
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                  THE COURT: To the extent that the information is
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        not included in the report, does -- isn't that the very -- is
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        that what you're looking for? I mean, I'm trying to --
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                  MS. GLAVIN: There's a lot that's not included in
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the report that we need.

They did not include in the report lots of information that they had which we believe to be exculpatory to the governor. That's been one of the big problems that we have with the report is that we believe it was a one-sided recitation of the facts. This will be the same from day one.

So you have in the report --

THE COURT: But isn't the agency permitted to decide what facts to include in their report?

MS. GLAVIN: They obviously did. But the problem that we had is we are defending.

Trooper 1 is basically cut and pasted the allegations from the report. And in defending that report, we know they spoke to a number of troopers. It is in item three of the documents we're looking for.

There are about 15 to 20 troopers that were interviewed and cited in the report that we -- that they gave us portions of what they may have said. We need those interview memos A, because we don't know who they are, but they're witnesses to this. And Trooper 1 would necessarily be relying on some of them.

THE COURT: The New York State Police didn't you give you duty rosters for that day? I mean, that's hard to believe.

MS. GLAVIN: There are more -- they don't have duty

rosters for who is on assignment.

We'll give you an example. The elevator touch. If you go to footnote 287, it talks about a trooper that Trooper 1 claimed was sitting at the desk that day and corroborated her. It would appear from the report that trooper was not at the desk that day, but we would like to talk to that trooper. There is another trooper that apparently was at the desk that day and doesn't remember --

THE COURT: And you don't have the identities of -MS. GLAVIN: No.

THE COURT: Why can't you get them from the New York State Police?

MS. GLAVIN: Because they don't know. That's the problem. They don't know. We've asked them. This is the problem.

THE COURT: So identity information is one category.

MS. GLAVIN: Okay.

THE COURT: And that is different than their underlying reports in a way. Okay. Go ahead.

MS. GLAVIN: And it's also what -- what did they say? These are witness statements. The other problem we have is that these people were questioned when their memories were fresh.

Take Trooper 1 for example. It could not be more relevant and meaningful and a compelling need in our case.

She's suing the governor saying these things happened. She had an informal interview in April of 2021. That is her first on-the-record statements factually. We need that memo in defending our case what she had to say then. And it's not just inconsistencies. It's basically what her perceptions were at the time when her memory was the freshest.

When she was put under oath in May, a lot of what we have seen in some of the interview memos.

You know, I can talk about, you know, Lindsey Boylan's.

What they asked people under oath was not always what they asked them in the interview memos. Howard Zemsky's under oath testimony differed materially from what they asked him in his informal interview memo. Vincent Straface, who was head --

THE COURT: But doesn't the change in the interview questions and the inclusion or lack of inclusion of information in the report go directly to their assertion of the deliberative process privilege?

MS. GLAVIN: No. Your Honor, there's no deliberative process privilege when you're talking about --

Look at what the Attorney General said when she announced what she was doing for this investigation in March of 2021. This is not deliberative process privilege. They had one job and one job only, which was to do an independent

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        review and do a public report. Deliberative process privilege
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        talks about agency decision making and policy.
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                  THE COURT: Agency decisions and positions. It's
       not just decisions. And --
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                  MS. GLAVIN: Agency decisions. But agency decisions
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        and positions do not cover fact finding. And there is --
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                  THE COURT: No, they don't cover the facts.
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                 MS. GLAVIN: -- there's pure --
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                  THE COURT: But under Lead Industries, isn't the
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        culling of the facts part of the deliberative process?
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                  MS. GLAVIN: It's not. We actually can brief this.
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        There is case law on point that it does not apply to interview
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       memos which are just basically reciting what witnesses said.
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                  THE COURT: I notice that nobody has cited the Lead
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        Industries case, which is one of the most important Second
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        Circuit cases that I know of.
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                 MS. GLAVIN: Which case is this?
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                  THE COURT: Lead Industries.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: Lead Industries.
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                  THE COURT: Judge Friendly deliberative process.
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        Admittedly, it's an exemption five case under FOIA. But in
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        the discussion of the common law privileges that are
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        applicable to the executive branch, Judge Friendly observed
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        that looking at a gargantuan volume of information, and
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figuring out from trying to get access to that backdrop of

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        information and comparing it to what was ultimately included
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        in a public report, would evince the deliberative process of
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        the agency.
                  And so I'm struggling with your argument that this
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        is to get at what's not included. Because to me that strikes
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        at the heart --
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                  MS. GLAVIN: It's the facts.
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                  THE COURT: -- of the deliberative process.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: No, Your Honor. We want the facts.
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        want what the witnesses said and did not say happened that are
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        witnesses to events that Trooper 1 has put into her complaint.
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                  THE COURT: But won't that illustrate the AG's
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        deliberative process in drafting a report?
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                  MS. GLAVIN: Your Honor, if that is the case, this
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        would cover every single interview of every single
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        investigation the AG does.
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                  THE COURT: It might.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: Deliberative process privilege does not
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        go that far, and we will give you case law. It's just it's
             That's not the law. Otherwise --
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                  THE COURT: I'm asking questions because this hasn't
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been briefed. That's what I'm getting at.

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MS. GLAVIN: So here's what my proposal is.

With respect on the sovereign immunity issue, if you want to just brief the privilege issues, we can do that. But

I believe that the -- what has been cited are more generalities by the AG's Office about why these privileges apply.

But I think the briefing has to cover the specific memos we are talking about. Which is you're talking about the ten complainants and their memos in unredacted transcripts that are all included, every one of their allegations are included in Trooper 1's complaint. And then you are talking about New York State Police officers who protect the governor, who are necessarily now part of the case, because Trooper 1 has made these allegations in the context of her job, the security protocols that are done every day in terms of driving the governor, who is in the tail car, where that person in the tail car would have been, you know, seen, what was said, et cetera. We need those facts.

We have so many witnesses that the AG cites that we don't have their names or know who they are and they could not be more important to our ability to defend this case.

If it wasn't Trooper 1 making these allegations about what was happening in her job when she was in the car, not in the car, when she was up at the house in Westchester, and what she was doing there, and who was there, and who saw what, UPC protocols would not have come into issue. But if they are making with respect to each of these 24 trooper memos, then they have to articulate for each of those memos.

And I also just think it could be redacted if it's talking about protocols, but protocols are going to be a big part of this trial. That's the reality.

MS. LONGLEY: Your Honor, if I may ask a question?

MS. GLAVIN: And then one -- one last point that I

do want to raise this, Your Honor, I do want to raise this

because this is bothering me. Okay. And I'm going to be -
I'm being straight with you here.

The comment about our argument on waiver of sovereign immunity, which we believe is very much based on solid legal ground that we --

THE COURT: A court order -- excuse me. A court order telling you he had to give me something does not waive his immunity.

MS. GLAVIN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: It does not.

MS. GLAVIN: -- Your Honor, I get -- I understand that may be your position. You understand that I agree with that position. We have briefed that before Judge Cave in another district. The comment about Judge Cave will see that for what it is concerned me, because I value my reputation, and I make what I believe to be legal arguments that are in good faith, based on facts and law. And maybe I am overreacting to your comment, but it hit me wrong and I -- it gives me great concern.

THE COURT: Okay. You can take it up with Judge Cave. Judge Cave is an independent actor. She'll do what she chooses to do. My view is that the attorney's general's office complying with a valid court order, whether they object to it or not, is not a basis to argue anything. We learned in civil procedure, in the Shuttlesworth case, that you have to abide by a court order, even if it's unconstitutional. Okay? They can argue all they want that they -- they have immunity and that my order does not impact any -- and there is no voluntariness to their disclosure, because that's what happened.

MS. GLAVIN: I -- Your Honor, I respectfully disagree. Maybe I can read the *Shuttleworth* (sic) case from civil procedure from 1993.

THE COURT: It's actually from the '50s. It was the case involving, you know, Martin Luther King's march, and my professor, Jack Greenberg, was the lawyer on the case, and I will never forget the case because at the end of the questions in the case book, he's like, imagine you were Martin Luther King's lawyer. What would you have told him to do? And Jack Greenberg's like, I was Martin Luther King's lawyer and I told him to march, and I was wrong.

MS. GLAVIN: Your Honor, I think when we're talking about sovereign immunity, it is a different issue. I think our waiver argue is valid, but I really do -- the tone of your

hearing just for me begs the question of -- because it's what

MS. LONGLEY: Because what -- a lot of what I'm

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-- you know, have you asked the trooper who was there, and what information there, rather than asking us for privileged and confidential reports on what people said. And just, like, that reflect the decisions on what to ask them, how that information was treated, but also again, I'm hearing a lot of, we want to know what was said to the investigators, which is different than finding the facts, which I think they have plenty of discovery tools to go after with parties to try to get that information. And it's concerning that they haven't tried to depose the trooper yet to ask her who was there, and instead want to get it through our interview memos and we're a non-party.

And I do think -- I know where -- you know, we're going to be happy to brief this, but I think to give a line-by-line analysis of every assertion of privilege over every page of a transcript and every interview memo is going to be incredibly burdensome, and when they haven't even tried to get that information which could be gotten from parties, I don't -- I think that the burden on a non-party is undue.

THE COURT: I hear you there, Ms. Longley. And of course, you know, as the party asserting the privilege, the burden to establish the privilege of course lies with you.

And the current privilege log, as I noted at the outset, is a little bit over broad in some areas and a little bit unclear, because I -- my intuition is that your position is going to be

that various privileges, you know, cover different portions of the documents, and I don't think it's appropriate in my role to be guessing to what your position is with regard to the various privileges.

MR. AMER: May --

THE COURT: Mr. Amer?

MR. AMER: Yeah. Just a couple points. Maybe there's a way for us to annotate the materials we've provided in camera that would focus portions of the document -- that would focus on portions of the document more specifically, or figure out a way to code the privilege log in a way that would make it more helpful to you.

I do think we have to be careful with what we say on the public docket given Ms. Glavin's fervent view that things we do in this courtroom, pursuant to court order, or for the Court's edification are fertile ground for additional waiver arguments, and I think it seems clear that that is a position that she is going to continue to advocate. And so, we just need to be cognizant of it.

One other point -- well, two other points I want to make. Ms. Glavin said that the protective order here solves problems because we can designate material as confidential on a protective order, and I just think that misses the point entirely, because the assurance of confidentiality, and this is mainly on the -- you know, this is particularly on the law

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enforcement privilege, you know, the assurances of confidentiality were that the material would not be shared with former Governor Cuomo, because he's the person that people were concerned about in connection with retaliation, and members of his staff who include some of the defendants here.
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So to say that we can provide it to the defendants here, but they can't disclose it to others, doesn't solve the problem of the fact that they get the documents. And so --

THE COURT: I understand the argument.

MR. AMER: -- so that's an issue.

THE COURT: The one question that I do have for you, though -- and I'm sorry to cut you off. If you want to finish the thought, go ahead.

MR. AMER: Well, I was going to make an unrelated point, so why don't you go ahead?

THE COURT: No, my question is with regard to this identity information piece, right? Because it's one thing to -- you know, Ms. Glavin is vociferously arguing that she needs to know who the witnesses are, right? Because some of the New York State Police witnesses in particular are actual witnesses to some of these alleged events.

And I hear you loud and clear, Ms. Longley. There may be solutions to that in third -- in party discovery.

Perhaps Trooper One has a recollection of who was there,

perhaps some of the other -- Mr. Surfacci (ph), others might have a recollection of who was there. But if they don't, if they don't know, if they can't remember, you know, what's your position on identity information as opposed to the underlying work product?

MR. AMER: I think it's problematic, because as you observed, and I'm always happy to follow the wisdom of Judge Friendly, you know, when you -- when you start down that road, this is information that was gathered from, you know, a larger universe of material, and the focus of the office and what they sought to elicit is itself protective under law enforcement privilege, as well as, by the way, attorney/client privilege to the extent that it was shared in discussions with our office among the investigators.

And I think your comment, you know, is a segue to the point I was going to make, which is, I hear Ms. Glavin say, we need the memos and I don't think that's a correct characterization. I think the memos for them are helpful, and I think it's a convenient way of getting the information, but it's not that they need them. It's that they don't want to do the work that a normal party would do in discovery to get the information the hard way, which is you take depositions of fact witnesses, you, you know, collect material that's not subject to privilege, and you -- you know, you learn the facts of your case through the ordinary discovery tools, not trying

to get it from a law enforcement agency based on an investigation that they conducted.

And I think, you know, the fact that a witness may not recall something today in exactly the same way they recalled it three years ago during our investigation, you know, leads them to say, oh well, we have to have those memos, because even if we take their depositions, we can't be certain that they're saying the same exact things they told the AG's office, so we need to have the interview memos. We need to compare. We need to see if we can impeach them.

I mean, if that argument were correct, it would swallow whole the law enforcement privilege, because it's an argument that could be made in every investigation. You could always claim that because we're now talking to a witness years after the investigation, how do we know that what they're telling us now under oath is what they told the investigators a few years ago, or maybe -- maybe they're lying, maybe their memories are faded. I just don't see that there's any way that that argument doesn't completely eviscerate the law enforcement privilege. And the fact that it would be nice for them to have it, or convenient, or useful, just doesn't get them home on this argument.

MS. GLAVIN: So on that point, and to address it directly, Mr. Amer, we have tried to do this the hard way, Your Honor. And that one of the best examples of this, and we

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        briefed it for the Court, is a deposition we took of one of
 2
        the complainants, Ana Liss. We had her AG interview
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        transcript, and we went over some of the things that were in
        her redactions. There were names that she mentioned.
 4
        couldn't remember who they were. That's the problem we have
 5
        with what -- and this is something that she said under oath --
 6
 7
                  THE COURT: But how important are these names? I
 8
        mean, we're talking about compelling need.
 9
                  MS. GLAVIN: This is a transcript that they reviewed
        -- released publically and --
10
11
                  THE COURT: I understand.
12
                  MS. GLAVIN: -- will redact a name.
13
                  THE COURT: But how is that -- what is -- what are
14
        the --
15
                  MS. GLAVIN: Because she's talking about witnesses.
16
                  THE COURT: Witnesses to what? Ms. Jackson has
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        never met Trooper One.
18
                  MS. GLAVIN: We're not -- but Ms. Liss's allegations
19
        are complete -- are included in whole. She's going to be in
20
        this case.
21
                  THE COURT: But what's the relevance of these other
22
        witnesses?
23
                  MS. GLAVIN: Because she's talking about witnesses
24
        to events, to allegations that Trooper One included in her
25
        complaint. Ana Liss is part of this case.
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                  THE COURT: You're not going to be having a trial on
 2
        every single -- mini trial on every single complainant's
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                  MS. GLAVIN: If you want to --
                  THE COURT: -- allegations.
 4
                  MS. GLAVIN: Your Honor, if you want to --
 5
                  THE COURT: It's not going to happen.
 6
 7
                  MS. GLAVIN: -- rule and exclude it now, thank you
 8
        Lord.
              This would save us a lot of work.
                  THE COURT: Well, Mr. McCool isn't here, so we'd be
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11
                  MS. GLAVIN: Well, Mr. Crane is.
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                  THE COURT: We can't rule on anything in the NE-3
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        case.
14
                  MS. GLAVIN: If you want to exclude all of that,
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        then that makes your job a lot easier.
16
                  THE COURT: I just -- we're just -- I'm just being
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        realistic in terms of what's actually likely to happen at
18
        trial. It may well be that some of these complainants
19
        testified. But do you really think Judge Jorisell (ph) is
20
        going to entertain trial within trial with regard to 10
21
        different complainants with regard to collateral witnesses?
22
                  MS. GLAVIN: I don't know, Your Honor. If you want
23
        to give me an advisory opinion, I don't know. But part of us
24
        being in a position to say, you should exclude these other 10
25
        people, let's talk about Ana Liss. Here are the six reasons
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why you should exclude her, okay? She cites these two people as witnesses.

We then spoke to those people. Those people say X, Y, and Z. It's not sufficiently like this. Let's knock that out of the case.

Lindsey Boylan, her name is mentioned 36 times in the complaint, okay? There are redactions on Lindsey Boylan's testimony. We will be asking Ms. Boylan about that. But for us to be in a position to make the arguments on 401 and 403, we're going to need the information.

THE COURT: I understand that, but I do think that you need to try to get it from the parties and the non-party witnesses in deposition. And you still haven't exact -- you haven't explained the relevance or import of the witnesses that Ana Liss allegedly didn't remember. I mean, like, witnesses to what?

MS. GLAVIN: Your Honor, I actually -- I haven't read her deposition in a while, and I took her deposition last summer so it's been a while.

THE COURT: Fair enough. Fair enough.

MS. GLAVIN: But I can tell you, at the time, it was important to me because I wanted to know who this staffer was, that staffer was. There were names that she's like, I can't remember.

THE COURT: Right. And look, you know, I understand

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        that -- I don't -- even Mr. Amer concedes that some of this
 2
        information is relevant, right? It had -- of course it's
 3
        relevant.
                  MS. GLAVIN: Trooper One's memo.
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                  THE COURT: Nobody is contesting the relevance.
 5
        What we're talking about and trying to get at is a path
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        forward figuring out how to, you know, give the parties an
 7
 8
        opportunity to be heard with regard to the pending issues
        before the Court.
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10
                  And what I'm trying to figure out procedurally is
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        what mechanism we're looking at here, and Mr. Amer has
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        proposed that we, you know, reach the motion to quash, but I
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        -- my question to you is, is that appropriate? Is the motion
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        to quash, you know, focused on the admitted list --
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                  MS. GLAVIN: It's not.
16
                  THE COURT: -- at 51.1? You know, so what
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        procedurally should we be doing here?
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                  MS. GLAVIN: I think that we have to -- I think we
19
        have to brief it on what these narrow issues are, based on
20
        what's in the complaint.
21
                  THE COURT: Right.
22
                  MS. GLAVIN: And how -- and the privilege issues.
23
                  THE COURT: Uh-huh.
24
                  MS. GLAVIN: Focused on the narrower universe,
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because a lot of this that you've asked about today, is very

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fact specific, and that's what we tried to do in our narrow requests, and I think it will highlight our issues with law enforcement exception given what Trooper One has alleged in her complaint, given how a lot of the protocols of PSU will become an important part of the trial, and that there are a lot of witnesses that we don't know who they are.

And with respect to, well, did Trooper One can tell you this, well, yes, we have interrogatories where she's listed people, but the -- but Trooper One doesn't know who all the witnesses were necessarily, because they interviewed, you know, it looks like two dozen troopers.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. GLAVIN: And I don't think she even knows --

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. GLAVIN: -- who some of them are.

THE COURT: But if she doesn't know who some of them are and they weren't present for the incidents that she's discussing, how are they relevant?

MS. GLAVIN: No. Or they were present, or they had a conversation with her and said, she said nothing of the sort and we discussed X, Y, and Z. That becomes very important to us. Diane Porratta (ph) must have said to us -- I mean, the other problem we have is, we don't have interview transcripts. Most of the troopers were done by informal interviews. Diane Porratta, when she came in, I think asked us about 10 times

for her interview memo to refresh her recollection. I mean, it's just -- probably more than 10 times. So this becomes very relevant to us being able to fend -- to defend against Trooper One's claims.

THE COURT: Right. I understand that argument with regard to compelling need. However, it does not answer the questions or bigger picture in terms of whether or not the omissions, events, deliberative process -- there's a lot of layers to this and --

MS. GLAVIN: And so, we need to brief it.

THE COURT: I guess we need to brief it. The question is, what's the briefing look like? Is it a motion to compel? Is it you responding to the motion to quash? Is he — the burden rests on the privilege with the OAG. So what are your thoughts on procedure?

MS. GLAVIN: I would propose that we do a motion to compel for the narrower universe, and they can do a crossmotion to quash, and we end up with the -- with the same briefing that we've done. So we filed a motion to compel, they oppose, do a cross-motion to quash, we do our reply, you do your reply.

THE COURT: Thoughts, Mr. Amer?

MR. AMER: That's fine, Your Honor. We do have to procedurally do something with the outstanding motion to quash. I don't know whether you want to deny it as moot and

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we'll move on and refile and do cross-motion to quash. Maybe that's the best way to handle it, because they've essentially -- you've already denied the motion to compel on the larger universe of material, and so now we're dealing with a narrower universe.
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I would say if it would be helpful to the Court -
MS. GLAVIN: Actually, can we just confer for a

second? I have an idea.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. GLAVIN: Why don't you and I talk for a second? (Counsel confer)

MS. GLAVIN: All right, Judge. So here's what I proposed to the AG's office, is that we reissue a subpoena that is the narrower category so we all know what we're dealing with, okay? And then they -- AGs would move to quash, citing the privileges, given that this is going to be focused on privilege, and then we would do the motion to compel, cross-motion to compel. So they would go for -- you guys would move to quash, we would oppose --

MR. AMER: I just don't think the motion to quash is limited to just privilege issues.

THE COURT: No, I think it includes sovereign immunity.

MS. GLAVIN: So do we want to -- that's what -- the question. We can brief --

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                 MR. AMER: I think you have to.
                  THE COURT: The briefing on it is a year old. I've
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 3
        looked closely and the developments of the law as recently as
        yesterday -- and you know, a whole bunch of district courts in
 4
       the Fifth Circuit are filing for Fifth Circuit, of course, but
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       other than that, other than Judge Locke, I haven't seen a lot
 6
 7
       of --
 8
                 MS. GLAVIN: Okay.
                  THE COURT: -- traction to the Fifth Circuit's
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10
        opinion. Perhaps you have. Perhaps you've done a more broad
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        search.
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                  MR. AMER: No, but --
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                  MS. LONGLEY: There's a -- there's an argument in
14
       May in the Fourth Circuit as you --
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                  THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay.
16
                  MS. LONGLEY: But it may not be exactly conterminous
17
       with the -- with how it's presented in this case.
18
                  THE COURT: Got it.
19
                  MR. AMER: But the law takes time to evolve, Your
20
        Honor.
21
                  THE COURT: Yes, it does.
22
                  MR. AMER: I would say one other -- so I think that
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       procedure makes sense. I would say, Your Honor might consider
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       whether it makes sense to order that we choose an exemplar
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interview memo, or maybe a few interview memos to annotate and

color code so that Your Honor can have a better sense as to -I think you indicated, you know, just trying to figure out
what privileges apply to which portions, and if that makes
sense, then you can put that in your scheduling order and that
way we can comply without waiving anything.

THE COURT: So it does make sense to me. Obviously the burden, again, rests with you. If you think that you're able to illustrate your points sufficiently in doing -- by doing it in that fashion, I certainly would give you the opportunity to try that in the initial instance, and then if there are remaining questions, you know, this may be the topic of additional, you know, filings that would be exparte.

I note, you know, in The New York Times Company v.

the United States Department of Justice case that Judge Failla
handled in the Southern District about the Volkswagen
emissions, I don't know if anybody was tracking that case.

You know, she had -- I think they gave her like a chart of
like what -- you know, which privileges were being asserted
over which portions. This is admittedly again, an Exception 5
FOIA case, but it is focused on deliberative process, and you
know, the Second Circuit affirmed her approach, you know, in a
summary order. So that approached seemed to work well for
her. It was a very lengthy report, but less voluminous, I
think, than the documents here.

MR. AMER: I think if Your Honor wants to give us

some leeway we can figure out what works and is the most sense. I think the problem is that to do it for every memo would be incredibly --

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. AMER: -- time consuming and burdensome. So -THE COURT: You know, Ms. Longley, I suspect, has a
deeper familiarity with the nitty-gritty of every memo and
what your position would be as to the different portions, and
so if you find it sufficient to submit sort of an example set
of like, this person -- you know, this situation, this portion
would be the privileged, you know, law enforcement
information, this portion would be relevant security, this
portion would be, you know, events deliberative process
because we chose not to include this portion in an ultimate
report because it was irrelevant, or whatever, you know, that
would be helpful.

MR. AMER: Okay. Again, there was one other comment that Your Honor made that I didn't respond to, so I just wanted to circle back to it, which concerned anticipation of litigation with respect to work product.

I do think the cases are clear that you don't have to anticipate the specific litigation in which the doctrine is being invoked, and I do think that certainly there was an anticipation that there might be an impeachment proceeding, which is considered litigation for purposes of work product,

and in fact, there was an impeachment proceeding that then didn't need to go forward once the governor resigned. Plus there was certainly --

THE COURT: But one of the questions that I -- MR. AMER: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- feel is not adequately addressed in the anticipation of litigation case law is, is this anticipatory litigation a litigation that you would be involved in? Because every case -- it makes sense, right? Almost every case, the party who is the holder of the documents is in the litigation.

And so, you're in this bizarre situation where you're asserting anticipation of litigation where there's been really -- been limited litigation that the attorney general has actually been involved in. The litigations would flow -- other prosecutors, the assembly as the prosecutor on the impeachment proceedings, the prosecutor in Albany. You know, is the attorney general in the shoes of somebody who can assert that litigation when they are not themselves in the litigations?

MR. AMER: Well, I do think we're involved in this proceeding, which is --

THE COURT: Involuntarily.

MR. AMER: -- right. And that is litigation that was anticipated as well, that the target of the investigation

could potentially go after our office, which is what happen -- what's happening.

I do think, again, Second Circuit recognizes a subpoena as a suit. So I think we actually did anticipate litigation against our office that actually came to fruition and is what is occupying much of our time in now two different district courts.

But I also think that anticipating other litigation that our office is not involved in is still sufficient for work product doctrine under, you know, the broad meaning of litigation being anticipated.

MS. LONGLEY: Can I -- can I also just add onto that, that I believe it was Ms. Glavin, right, when the -- soon after the report was issued, made public statements that Cuomo was exploring all legal options, and that was interpreted -- and similar statements were made to the investigators while they were investigating that led them to believe that Cuomo was likely to challenge the investigation itself, or sue the attorney general, take action against the investigators.

He did file grievances against the attorney general and the lead investigators of the case. He has sued our office multiple times related to the report. And while he may have made a decision not to directly file a suit challenging the conclusions of the report through like an Article 78, he

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certainly -- it was reasonably anticipated by our office that he was going to do that, and the memos were drafted with that very real possibility in mind, and that you do not need to show that the exact litigation you anticipated is what bore out to establish that the memos were prepared in anticipation of litigation.
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MS. GLAVIN: So could I just respond to that briefly?

THE COURT: Yes, and I assume this is going to be including in the briefing, right?

MS. GLAVIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Because we will order the transcript, but at the end of the day, I need your legal authority for all of this.

MS. GLAVIN: Yes.

THE COURT: On both sides.

MS. GLAVIN: So let's just be clear what Governor
Cuomo sued the attorney general for. Sued the attorney
general for refusing to advance his legal fees. Okay? That
was not about the report, and the Court agreed with us and --

THE COURT: Yep.

MS. GLAVIN: -- reversed the attorney general's decision, which he made and missed it for reelection campaign. The second thing that the governor is suing the attorney general's office for is the denial of his FOIL request. Those

1 are the lawsuits that Andrew Cuomo has sued Letitia James for. 2 MS. LONGLEY: What about the grievance complaint? 3 MS. GLAVIN: The grievance complaint isn't litigation. The grievance complaint, that can happen to any 4 lawyer in any case. Gary Levine filed one against me, so the 5 ethics commission -- and we sued Gary Levine. 6 7 So it's -- the issue on work product, Your Honor, 8 and this will be briefed, is what was the substantial purpose in preparing the document. And the substantial purpose in 9 10 preparing those documents was to document what witnesses told 11 them to put into a report. 12 THE COURT: Yep. 13 MS. GLAVIN: The fact that you might anticipate that 14 the report you're going to issue is something that if, you 15 know, the target of the report may have issues with later on, 16 or people cited in the report may initiate lawsuits later on, 17 it doesn't make it work product for those purposes, but we 18 will brief it for the Court.

THE COURT: I certainly want to see both sides' legal authority.

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So with regard to the strategy of reissuing the subpoena and then there will be a motion to quash, crossmotion to compel, replies, et cetera, what sort of timing are we looking at, Ms. Glavin?

MS. GLAVIN: I -- if it's possible --

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                  THE COURT: And I apologize. I keep eating cough
 2
        drops. I have this weird throat thing going on. Last night I
 3
        couldn't talk at all. I was like, am I going to be able to
 4
        talk by the morning?
                  MS. GLAVIN: Yeah. Yeah, so I -- we can reissue the
 5
        subpoena, I think probably within a few days.
 6
 7
                  THE COURT: Okay.
 8
                 MS. GLAVIN: I can get that done. And then, when do
 9
        you guys want to file?
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                  THE COURT: So today's April 19th, Friday.
11
                  MS. GLAVIN: Keeping in mind when Passover is, but
12
13
                  THE COURT: Passover is all next week.
14
                  MS. GLAVIN: -- it will probably take a few weeks.
15
                  MR. AMER: Should we propose a scheduling order?
16
                  THE COURT: Sure.
17
                  MR. AMER: Then we could then look at calendars and
18
       not have to --
19
                  THE COURT: Yeah, that would be fine.
20
                  MR. AMER: -- do it here.
21
                  THE COURT: If you want to submit a proposed
22
        scheduling order. I don't know who's observing and who's
23
        going to be out Monday, Tuesday, those first two nights. You
24
       want to submit something like Wednesday or Thursday? That's
25
        fine with me.
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                  MR. AMER: Well, when are you going to have the
 2
        reissued subpoena?
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                  MS. GLAVIN: We'll be able to do it in a few -- it
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        will be next week.
 5
                  MR. AMER: Okay.
                  MS. GLAVIN: Do you want to confer and then we
 6
 7
        propose?
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                  MR. AMER: That's what I'm suggesting.
 9
                  MS. GLAVIN: Yeah.
10
                  THE COURT: Yeah. Maybe by next Friday? If the
11
        subpoenas could be issued by Wednesday or Thursday, maybe, you
12
        could --
13
                  MS. GLAVIN: That's fine.
14
                  THE COURT: -- confer in the interim.
15
                  MR. AMER: Submit the scheduling order by next
16
        Friday.
17
                  THE COURT: Submit the scheduling order by next
18
        Friday.
                Does that work?
19
                  MS. LONGLEY: I'm going to be out through Tuesday,
20
        but I can try to -- for this limited purpose, confer --
                  MR. AMER: Yeah, it's just -- it's just --
21
22
                  MS. LONGLEY: Yeah.
23
                  MR. AMER: -- looking at calendars.
24
                  THE COURT: You're out through Tuesday the 20th or
        the 30th?
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                  MS. LONGLEY: The 30th.
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                  THE COURT: Oh, because that is the end of Passover.
 3
                  MS. LONGLEY: Yeah.
                  THE COURT: What is your view on when you -- is the
 4
 5
       week -- so --
                  MS. GLAVIN: Yeah, we could submit it. I think it's
 6
 7
        just a matter of us conferring --
 8
                  MR. AMER: Yeah, it's a calendar --
 9
                  MS. GLAVIN: -- and looking at calendars.
10
                  MR. AMER: -- it's a question of calendars.
11
                  THE COURT: Okay. You might be able to work it out
12
        right now.
13
                  MS. LONGLEY: Yeah. Yes.
14
                  THE COURT: Right after the conference. Okay.
15
                 MS. LONGLEY: Yeah. Your Honor, could we also just
16
        ask to be excused from the normal requirement for a meet and
17
        confer on the subpoena once the subpoena is issued?
18
                  THE COURT: Yes. Yes, you are excused.
19
                 MS. GLAVIN: They've been very productive so far.
20
                  THE COURT: Yeah, they've been so productive. Her
21
       motion to quash is denied for lack of meet and confer.
22
                  MS. LONGLEY: Okay.
23
                  THE COURT: Can you imagine?
24
                 MS. GLAVIN: Yes.
                  THE COURT: So, yes, we will expect the parties'
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proposed schedule by next Friday, October -- October. April 26th, and I also note that we have some, like, currently pending motions on this particular docket at ECF 53, which is seeking disclosure of witness names, ECF 54 and 55, again asking the Court to provide unredacted memos -- asking for me to tell the OAG to provide me unredacted memos and the memos that were redacted for privilege by the -- by Cleary, and I believe it was the OAG's position on that one that there were no such memos, Mr. Amer? What is the story with, I think it's ECF 54 and your response was at 55.

MR. AMER: I think our -- they -- the interview memos had been redacted solely -- and this is in the -- I think this was in affidavits, but they were redacted solely for work product. And so, there is no version of the interview memos that have already been redacted to address all of the privileges we're asserting. So we just don't see how it would be helpful or useful to the Court to see anything other than the set of interview memos you already have.

THE COURT: Yeah, unredacted.

MR. AMER: Which are unredacted.

THE COURT: Now, I wasn't sure on why that was asked of me, and I also have to confess, I'm not a human compare right. You know, I'm trying to go line by line and comparing the two sets. I wasn't sure what Ms. Trzaskoma was driving at there. Ms. Glavin, if you know?

MS. GLAVIN: I do. So because work product is one of the privileges that was raised, the memo -- so again, the universe we're talking about is 36 memos here. The memos, as we understand it, were already redacted for work product privilege by Cleary, and there is an affirmation to that effect in the *Bennett* case.

And so, the reason we wanted you to get the unredacted memos is because that has already been done. So if you look at those redacted memos, which were redacted for work product, then you're looking at what the other privileges would be, beyond -- because they've been redacted for work product.

THE COURT: Mr. Amer?

MR. AMER: Well, I just don't see how that's helpful, because you have the memos completely unredacted, so you can see the portions of the memos that all the privileges apply to.

My understanding of what they were trying to suggest is that you could somehow just say, well, I agree with the work product redactions, so give them the redacted memos, but that doesn't work because we're not relying solely on work product, we're relying on all these other privileges. So it's not as though this is some sort of shortcut for getting them the interview memos. It's not. And so, it just seems pointless.

THE COURT: It's really burdensome, to be candid,

Ms. Glavin. If they -- because they aren't just asserting

work product, as you know. They're asserting a whole host of

privileges, and in looking at the unredacted memos, again, I

don't want to -- I'm not the lawyer for the attorney general.

I don't want to devine what your assertions of privilege are

based upon the privilege log over different portions of the

memos. That's your burden.

So I'm not inclined to try to do an interim review of partially redacted memos. If the assertions are the work product -- you know, you'll illustrate in your submission which portions of the documents you think are protected by law enforcement privilege, deliberative process, attorney/client, work product, whatever. Whatever it is. And if it gets to the point where I think I need to somehow read this other set, perhaps I'll take that step at some future date, but I don't see that as particularly productive at this point. So --

MS. GLAVIN: I don't want to make things unproductive for you, Judge.

THE COURT: Yes, Ms. Trzaskoma.

(No audible response)

THE COURT: But are you conceding that their work -but, Ms. Trzaskoma, are you impliedly conceding that their
work product redactions are correct? I mean, to me, the
letter was like, we want you to compare two sets of documents

to each other, and I didn't understand why.

(No audible response)

THE COURT: Mr. Amer?

MR. AMER: I don't understand how it eases anybody's burden, because we're not just asserting work product privilege, nor do I hear Ms. Trzaskoma agreeing that they will accept our work product redactions as being correct. So I just don't understand what purpose it serves, honestly.

THE COURT: Would you be willing to accept the notion that the work product redactions are accurate and I don't need to reach that issue? Is that what you're implying, Ms. Trzaskoma?

(No audible response)

THE COURT: All right. I don't even know what universe as redacted documents even exists. Do you, Mr. Amer?

MR. AMER: We have -- Cleary has redacted the interview memos solely for work product. Again, this is just, you know, death by 1,000 cuts. So then they're going to -- you know, as if, you know, this will lead to the production of this redacted set. Then they're going to look at them and decide whether their initial belief, based on the limited set they had seen, bears out with the rest of them. What's the point of this?

Your Honor should be looking at the unredacted memos in camera to determine whether all the privileges, not just

work product, are ones that you think should be upheld. And we will endeavor to provide a roadmap, without undertaking a huge burden, to steer you to which portions of the -- of a sample set of memos you can review to see illustrative examples of the information that falls within the various categories of documents.

So I just -- based on that, I think, you know, looking at the unredacted set is far more helpful than for you to see a set that is only redacted for work product.

And certainly in our example set, we'll identify what is the work product portion, but that doesn't even seem to be in contention because what I'm hearing from the other side is that based on the interview memos they've already reviewed, they don't really have an issue with what we've claimed as work product. So that should be the easy one.

THE COURT: That -- it may be. If it is -- if the memos are shorter as a result of --

MS. GLAVIN: They are.

THE COURT: -- having some of the redactions already in place and you want to use that set as your starting point, it's up to you.

Ms. Longley is shaking her head no.

MS. LONGLEY: Your Honor, the context in which those memos was redacted was for sharing with fellow law enforcement entities and government investigators, and it was pursuant to

confidentiality agreements, and it was done in a way to not -to preserve our privilege as much as possible.

I'm not sure, and I'd have to relook at the documents, that we would agree or concede that the parameters of the work product would be exactly the same as they were redacted for those purposes and at that point in time as we are asserting here. And we take the position that we didn't waive any privilege by sharing them with other investigative bodies, and those are the only -- only recipients who have gotten them from us.

So I just -- I think it's problematic to use those documents as the basis for arguing and ruling on the privileges before Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So -- okay. Ms. Trzaskoma.

Ms. Trzaskoma. Ms. Trzaskoma. I need you to start over. For some reason the FTR machine isn't picking you up. I'm going to put my mic by the speaker. Go ahead. Go ahead now, Ms. Trzaskoma.

MS. TRZASKOMA: The provision -- to the attorney general -- attorney --

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Trzaskoma. Ms. Trzaskoma.

Ms. Trzaskoma. For some reason our court recording equipment is just not getting you, even with my microphone directly next to the speaker. So I'm just -- we're not catching this for the record.

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Ms. Glavin, would you like to repeat anything that
Ms. Trzaskoma just said so that we have a clear record?
          MS. GLAVIN: Yes, Your Honor. With respect to the
memos, Cleary Gottlieb submitted an affidavit and said, we
have redacted 155 -- the memos, for work product privilege.
They were very clear, it was for work product privilege.
          The fact -- we've seen, I don't know, maybe -- I
don't have the number -- a couple dozen of these, and just
based on my own familiarity with how memos are done and law
enforcement documents these, I didn't see anything in there
that bothered me that was an overreach on work product
privilege. I really didn't. I was fine with that, and I
think we would be willing to -- so we just viewed it as, it
would be a starting point because Cleary is on record, under
oath, telling Judge Cave there's 155 memos we already redacted
for work product. And so that would be the starting point,
and we actually think that would narrow the issues for you,
because then you -- beyond those, then you're dealing with
attorney/client privilege, whether that applies deliberative
process or law enforcement privilege.
          MR. AMER: Can I make a --
          THE COURT: I think that you're -- I'm sorry.
ahead, Mr. Amer.
          MR. AMER: I'm totally confused about this, and let
me just give you a quick example for why I think this is
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totally unhelpful, and I think counterproductive.

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You're going to get an interview memo that has portions blacked out because they're redacted for work product. Some of what's blocked out may also be privileged on other grounds. There may be overlap. So what are you going to do with that. You're going to -- you're going to have privileges that apply to portions of a memo that are blacked out.

Doesn't it make more sense for the Court to only focus on the unredacted memos so that you can see the entirety of what's there. And to the extent that there are portions of the memo that are privileged for multiple reasons, you'll have that, plus you'll have the context of what surrounds what's been redacted. I just don't see how staring at a memo that's got a bunch of blacked out portions is going to make things better, not worse.

THE COURT: Well, at the end of the day, as much as I appreciate the efforts to streamline the questions and reduce the burden on the Court to review the memos, it is the attorney general's burden to establish the applicability of these privileges, and it is their -- in their court in terms of what they want to submit to support that. And I would just note, you know, there's a legion of cases talking about how, in establishing that burden, the person asserting the privilege of course has to provide sufficient factual

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information to justify the privilege and the protection claimed for each document.

And so I really encourage you to make your best efforts to pick appropriate exemplars and explain with regard to the ones that aren't used as exemplars, you know, sort of which example they go with in terms of, you know, this memo is a similar structure and format to the Example 1, and so that I can understand what the attorney general's position is.

I'm not inclined to review two sets of documents at this juncture. I don't find that to be efficient, as there's also a legion of cases talking about how ex parte review of documents is the exception, not the rule, and this is already a very burdensome endeavor for the OAG and for the Court, and to the extent that the work product privilege becomes an overwhelming piece of this and I need to understand what Cleary's position was with regard to disclosure to the Albany District Attorney's Office, I'm sure that I will be able to get that information if and when it becomes relevant. But I just don't see the relevance at this point, given the broader assertions of privilege at issue here.

So at this point, with the current briefing schedule that we just set on the hopeful path forward -- we didn't set the briefing schedule.

The briefing schedule I'm expecting to get next week, I am going to just deny Exhibit at ECF 53, 54, and 59

without prejudice. I don't find the suggestions particularly helpful, given the posture that we've decided to undertake today, and I'm not going to conduct a review of the documents twice.

MR. AMER: Procedurally, what will be the effect of the new subpoena on the present subpoena? Is that prior subpoena going to be withdrawn?

THE COURT: Ms. Glavin?

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MS. GLAVIN: Yeah. We'll -- yeah, we'll withdraw it and we will notice a new subpoena to you.

MR. AMER: And then I guess that technically moots our motion to quash that's already on file, so perhaps that just, loose end needs to be tied up as well.

THE COURT: Okay. So if Governor Cuomo is withdrawing the large subpoena, the prior subpoena that was the topic of the original motion to compel, we will note that as part of the minute entry and order and we will, as a formal matter, deny the motion to quash as moot, we will deny ECF 53, 54, and 59 without prejudice, and we will expect the parties' proposed briefing schedule next Friday.

In, you know, preparing your briefing, I really do need this to be granular, unfortunately, because that is the nature of any privilege review and it -- you know, looking at the documents, a lot of the facts are out there. And so in addition to that, I need to understand your arguments as to

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        waiver.
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                  MR. AMER: We probably will need some expansion of
        the page limit, given that we need to cover sovereign immunity
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        as well as privilege, so perhaps in your scheduling order you
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        can give the parties leave to file in large briefs, depending
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        on what you think would be appropriate.
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                  THE COURT: What page limit are you operating under,
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        Mr. Amer?
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                  MS. GLAVIN: Can we talk about that too, because I
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        think just the sovereign immunity alone is pretty hefty?
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                  THE COURT: No, I'm just asking what page --
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                  MS. GLAVIN: No.
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                  THE COURT: -- limits you're referring to, because
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        my individual rules don't have page limits.
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                  MR. AMER: I guess I thought that --
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                  THE COURT: My individual rules incorporate the
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        district judge's rules.
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                  MR. AMER: Yes.
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                  MS. LONGLEY: Yeah.
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                  MR. MARKEY: Yes, that's what I thought.
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                  THE COURT: So I have to confess, I don't have Judge
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        DeArcy Hall's page limit off the top of my head. Probably 25
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        would be my guess.
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                  MR. AMER: I think it's probably 25.
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THE COURT: So, discuss that amongst yourselves.

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        And I do think that that was part of the issue with regard to
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        the first sets of briefs. The privileges were very, very
        brief. You know, the briefs on the privilege were very short
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        because you guys were very busy, you know, arguing the
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        sovereign immunity and the relevance in proportionality
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        points. And so -- you know, when I went back to review all of
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        the briefing with regard to privilege, it just was, you know,
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        kind of -- I thought the little bit of drift on the facts, and
        also it certainly could use a little bit more of a deep dive
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        into the law.
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                  Ms. Glavin, so you guys want to talk about page --
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        pages and --
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                  MS. GLAVIN: Yeah.
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                  MR. AMER: We'll -- we'll --
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                  THE COURT: -- agree upon page limits?
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                  MR. AMER: We'll include it, a proposal, in our
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        Friday submission.
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                  THE COURT: That's fine. That's fine. All right.
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                  Anything else, Mr. Amer?
                  MR. AMER: Nothing from our side.
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                  THE COURT: Ms. Glavin?
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                  MS. GLAVIN: No, Your Honor. Good to see you as
        always.
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                  THE COURT: Nice to see you too, and sincerely know
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        -- really, no offense intended.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: Thank you. I appreciate it.
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                  THE COURT: Okay.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: All right. Yeah.
                  THE COURT: All right. Have a good afternoon,
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        everybody.
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                  MR. AMER: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                  MS. GLAVIN: You too, Judge. Have a good weekend.
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        (Proceedings concluded at 12:17 p.m.)
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